On the Problem of Vague Terms: A Glossary of Clearly Stated Assumptions & Careful, Patient, Descriptions

Coase 1930 endures through the decades as one of the most-cited papers in economics due to the fact that it highlights a fundamental and equally enduring problem: "Economic theory has suffered in the past from a failure to state clearly its assumptions. Economists in building up a theory have often omitted to examine the foundations on which it was erected. This examination is, however, essential not only to prevent the misunderstanding and needless controversy which arise from a lack of knowledge of the assumptions on which a theory is based, but also because of the extreme importance for economics of good judgement in choosing between rival sets of assumptions." In 1944 Von Neumann and Morgenstern offered the simply, yet invariably rejected solution: "In… economics the most fruitful work may be that of careful, patient description; indeed this may be by far the largest domain for the present and some time to come….Economic problems [have been and are often] not formulated clearly and are often stated in such vague terms as to make mathematical treatment a priori appear hopeless because it is quite uncertain what the problems really are. There is no point in using exact methods where there is no clarity in the concepts and issues to which they are to be applied. Consequently the initial task is to clarify the knowledge of the matter by further careful descriptive work." This paper offers a stone along the path to the solution to this problem by offering a glossary in this spirit, a glossary germain to some of the most fundamental, open problems in economics. As the fate of the human race may lay in the balance to finding solutions to these problems, this glossary may be a steop in the right direction.economic terms; methodology; scientific method; coase 1930; Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944; definitions; careful, patient descriptions

On the evolutionary stability of the Uruguayan Savanna

Tropical and subtropical grasslands have been the single-most valuable resource throughout the course of human evolution, and, to this point, despite fundamental errors associated with economic theory which suggest otherwise, these rangelands remain amongst the most evolutionarily stable (and thus valuable) assets on Earth. However, given the problem noted above and, in conjunction with the inherently short-term nature of political motivations, these grasslands are being rapidly lost to crop-lands and urban sprawl – and thus it is of little surprise that conservation efforts are most prominent amongst private individuals with long-term goals and dominant Resource Holding Power ($). This brief communique submits that, not only would political leaders serve their nations well by extending long-term economic incentives to those who conserve grasslands, but that, moreover, economic prosperity, food security, and national security may prove ephemeral without such measures.Long Term Investment Strategy ; Diversification ; Sustainability ; Tragedy of the Commons ; Food Security ; Rangelands

On the Truly Noncooperative Game of Island Life: Introducing a Unified Theory of Value & Evolutionarily Stable Island Economic Development Strategy

This discourse offers a solution to The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development on islands. This hypothesis offers a foundational, sub-game solution to The Island Survival Game, a counterintuitive, dominant economic development strategy for ‘islands’ (and relatively insular states). This discourse also tables conceptual building blocks, prerequisite analytical tools, and a guiding principle for The Earth Island Survival Game, a bounded delay supergame which models The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development at the global level. We begin our exploration with an introduction to The Principle of Relative Insularity, a postulate which informs ESS for ‘island’ and ‘continental’ players alike. Next, we model ‘island’ economic development with two bio-geo-politico-economic models and respective strategies: The Mustique Co. Development Plan, and The Prince Edward Island Federal-Provincial Program for Social and Economic Advancement. These diametrically opposed strategies offer an extraordinary comparative study. One island serves as a highly descriptive model for The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development; the other model informs ESS. The Island Survival Game serves as a remarkable learning tool, offering lessons which promote Darwinian fitness, resource holding power, self-sufficiency, and cooperative behaviour, by illuminating the illusive path toward sustainable economic development.Non-cooperative games, evolutionary game theory, relative insularity, islands, tragedy of the commons, sustainable economic development, resource holding power, evolutionarily stable strategy, long distance dispersal

On the Problem of the Hedgeless Hedgefunds of Sleepy Hollow: An Evolutionary Stable Solution in an Open Letter to Kenneth Griffin

This discourse explores and illuminates a fundamental problem, the Achilles' heel, which dominates the hedgefund industry: namely, that hedgefunds no are not positioned to accomplish what they were designed to do: namely, hedge against catastrophic loss in the financial markets. Contemporary fund strategies where built upon random-walk, efficient market theories which are now well-known to be false, thus our present dilemma. This discourse tables the Evolutionary Stable Strategy, for prospective hedgefund investors which, essentially, follows the dominant strategy outlined by Smith in 1776. Our discourse also highlights the dimly recognized difference between internal and external financial shocks, as well as several key points regarding economic methodology.hedgefunds; evolutionary stable strategy; problem of induction; kenneth griffin; george soros; karl popper; clive granger; adam smith; ted turner; catastrophic risk; external shocks; internal shocks; citadel investments; hawaii; rangelands; ranch economics; david hume

Truly Non-Cooperative Games: A Unified Theory

This dissertation introduces "Truly Non-Cooperative Games" – axioms and complimentary negotiation models developed to analyse the human "Struggle for Life" – and presents "The Principle of Relative Insularity", a unified theory of value which unites economics, astrophysics, and biology. In brief, we discover that, reductio ad absurdum, value is a derivative function of relative insularity.non-cooperative games; theory of value; economic development strategy; systemic risks; global threat mitigation; national security; the problem of induction; relative insularity; international cooperation; human survival

On the Truly Noncooperative Game of Life on Earth: Darwin, Hardin, & Ostrom's Nontrivial Errors

This paper introduces a game-theoretical framework for The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development, axioms which help clarify the problem itself, and, reductio ad absurdum, falsify many widely-held economic, evolutionary, and ecological principles. This brief communiqué lays the foundation for evolutionary stable economic development and survival strategies – strategies which foster international cooperation, global threat mitigation, food & energy security, long-distance dispersibility, and thus, ultimately, the long-term survival of the human species.sustainable economic development; tragedy of the commons; noncooperative games; natural selection; global threats; food security; national security; human survival

On the Problem of the Island of Earth: Introducing a Universal Theory of Value in an Open Letter to The President of the United States

This paper introduces a unified theory of value.theory of value; evolutionary stable solution; economic power; military power; national security; global threat mitigation; extinction; human evolution; ideological environmentalism; the problem of induction; karl popper; F.A. von Hayek; austrian economics

On the Problem of Economic Power: Lessons from the Natural History of the Hawaiian Archipelago

One of the greatest logicians of the twentieth century, Bertrand Russell, proposed that Economic power, unlike military power, is not primary, but derivative. Curiously, this conjecture has received scarce attention. This paper explores this theory. Our illustrative discourse tests this overlooked theory in the light of evolution: We model Homo evolution by sampling the past ≈1000 years of cultural evolution in the Hawaiian archipelago. Our analysis concludes Russell's theory is true.economic power; military power; evolutionary game theory; cultural evolution; resource holding power; long-distance dispersal; Second Amendment; Kamehameha; Hawaii; sovereignty; annexation

On the Travesty of the Tragedy of the Commons: Hardin's Nontrivial Error

Garrett Hardin’s "Tragedy of the Commons" remains one of the most frequently cited works across the spectrum of science — indeed, a visit to the website of the influential journal which published this paper in 1968 reveals that this revolutionary communique remains amongst its ‘top articles’. But Hardin's enduring, influential theoretical development presents a serious problem: it is not a single theory, but rather four major theories in a stormy sea of ill-conceived and untenable auxiliary conjecture. Moreover, the solid core of Hardin's central thesis was simply a restatement of a previously published theory, the promethean vision of William Forster Lloyd.Tragedy of the Commons; William Forster Lloyd; Garrett Hardin; Scientific Method;

On the Problem of Dependent People: hyperbolic discounting in Atlantic Canadian island jurisdictions

Prince Edward Island's Economics, Statistics and Federal Fiscal Relations Division's 33rd Annual Statistical Review reports the total value of 2006 fish landings was CAD $166.6 MM. This paper discloses a preliminary finding that the actual total value of fish landings for 2006 was approximately CAD 416.5 MM. Furthermore, this discourse submits that this entrenched systemic error has been consistently generated for all 33 years that the Annual Statistical Review has been published. Moreover, this systemic error creates a ripple-effect and promotes bias through all relative natural resource valuations. This significant conjecture is presented within an institutional context which serves as the foundation for this error generation, including other errors associated with The Problem of Induction and The Tragedy of the Commons. Within this broad context, this paper focuses upon deficient resource valuation methods, especially as they relate to dependency and valuation errors. Our analysis contrasts the failure of fishery management amongst dependent Canadian islanders,and the relative success of fishery management amongst independent Icelandic islanders. The possibilities that independent people enjoy higher levels of rationality, efficiency, happiness, economic sustainability, Darwinian fitness, resource holding power, and, are thus, ceteris paribus, less likely to commit errors associated with The Problem of Induction are taken into consideration. Likewise, consideration is given to the notion that dependent people are more likely to exhibit irrational behaviour, develop deeper dependencies, and to contribute to a wide array of maladaptive behaviours, such as those which exacerbate The Tragedy of the Commons.tragedy of the commons; insularity; problem of induction; methodology; sub-national island jurisdiction; prince edward island; cancer; bravo; potato production; Chlorothalonil Carcinogenicity; prince edward island development plan; confederation bridge; prince edward island tourism